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Abstract This study investigated mechanisms behind
proactive and reactive aggression, by examining whether
four types of self-serving cognitive distortions and the
personality traits agreeableness and conscientiousness dif-
ferently predicted proactive and reactive aggression. Self-
report questionnaires and a peer nominations method were
administered to 173 sixth grade children (age 10–13) of
regular elementary schools in the Netherlands. Negative
binomial regression analyses showed that proactive
aggression was predicted by self-centered and disagreeable
tendencies, whereas reactive aggression was predicted by
the misattribution of blame to others and the self-regulatory
aspects of agreeableness and conscientiousness. Findings
emphasize the need to differentiate proactive and reactive
aggression in order to accurately predict, prevent and treat
aggressive behaviors in childhood.
Keywords Proactive aggression  Reactive aggression 
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Introduction
Childhood aggression has repeatedly been associated with
concurrent psychosocial maladjustment (Card and Little
2006), as well as with later externalizing problems (Vitaro
et al. 1998). In order to improve understanding, prediction
and treatment of aggressive behaviors, subtypes of
aggression have been defined. Often, a distinction is made
between proactive and reactive aggression, based on the
underlying function or motivation of the aggressive
behavior. Proactive aggression is planned behavior that is
unprovoked and used for instrumental gain or dominance
over others (Dodge and Coie 1987). It is associated with
social learning principles, because it is driven by positive
outcome expectancies and controlled by its positive rein-
forcement. In contrast, reactive aggression occurs in reac-
tion to a perceived or real threat or provocation (Dodge and
Coie 1987). It is usually accompanied by anger and has its
roots in the frustration-aggression hypothesis (Berkowitz
1989). Although both types of aggression can co-occur in
the same child, research has shown that they are clearly
distinct phenomena (Polman et al. 2007). There is exten-
sive evidence showing proactive and reactive aggression to
be associated with different etiological, expressive and
persisting markers (e.g., Arsenio et al. 2009; Card and
Little 2006; Smithmyer et al. 2000). The present study
contributed to this research, by identifying social-cognitive
processes and personality traits behind proactive and
reactive aggression.
Social-Cognitive Processes in Proactive and Reactive
Aggression
In addition to a well-documented role of (social-) cognitive
factors in aggression (e.g., Arsenio and Lemerise 2004;
Huesmann 1988; Huesmann and Guerra 1997), specifically
for reactive and proactive aggression social-cognitive dif-
ferences have been identified. In explaining the distinction
between proactive and reactive aggression, an important
role is assigned to social information processing (Crick and
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Dodge 1996). According to the social information pro-
cessing model of Crick and Dodge (1994), a child’s
behavioral response to a social cue occurs as a result of six
subsequent mental processing steps, including (1) encoding
social cues, (2) interpreting social cues, (3) clarifying a
goal, (4) constructing a response, (5) selecting a response
and (6) enacting this response. It has been shown that
proactive and reactive aggression are differently related to
these steps of social information processing. Proactive
aggression is associated with problems with the clarifica-
tion of goals and the construction and selection of a
response, whereas reactive aggression is related to diffi-
culties with the encoding and interpretation of social cues
(Crick and Dodge 1996).
Besides differences in social information processing
patterns, moral, emotional and cognitive differences
between reactive and proactive aggression have been
identified. Research for instance shows that although
reactive-aggressive children have difficulties judging social
cues, they do seem to have a central moral value that
intentionally harming others is not fair (Arsenio et al.
2009). In contrast, proactive-aggressive children appear
disturbed in certain morally relevant values (Arsenio et al.
2009), and have positive outcome expectancies for
aggression (e.g., Peets et al. 2011). Furthermore, whereas
reactive-aggressive behavior is correlated with poor emo-
tion regulation, proactive-aggressive behavior appears
associated with so-called callous, unemotional traits
(Marsee and Frick 2007).
Altogether, these results support the notion of distinct
patterns of social information processing, moral reasoning
and emotion processing in proactive and reactive aggres-
sion. Less is known, however, about the actual cognitions
behind these behaviors. What thoughts or beliefs cause the
child to decide that an aggressive response would be
appropriate? Based on literature on general aggressive and
antisocial behavior, the present study aimed to further
disentangle cognitive processes underlying both aggressive
functions focusing on specific distorted beliefs about
aggression.
Cognitive Distortions Associated with Proactive
and Reactive Aggression
Several studies on more general forms of aggression and
antisocial behavior have focused on so-called self-serving
cognitive distortions. Self-serving cognitive distortions are
referred to as inaccurate or rationalizing beliefs, thoughts
and attitudes (Barriga and Gibbs 1996). Both in delinquent
and in non-delinquent adolescents and adults, the presence
of these self-serving cognitive distortions has been asso-
ciated with aggressive, offending, and antisocial behavior
(e.g., Palmer 2003, 2005; Van der Velden et al. 2010). The
cognitive distortions would facilitate aggression and pro-
vide aggressive individuals with justifications for their
behavior, thereby contributing to its ongoing use (e.g.,
Barriga and Gibbs 1996). The often used four-category
typology of self-serving cognitive distortions identifies four
cognitive distortions, which are stated to be interrelated
constructs (Barriga and Gibbs 1996). ‘Self-centeredness’
refers to the belief that one’s own views, needs, rights and
desires are so important that those of others are not taken
fully into account or are even completely ignored. ‘Mini-
mizing/mislabeling’ is the belief that antisocial behavior
causes no real harm or is even admirable. ‘Blaming others’
describes the misattribution of blame for one’s own anti-
social behaviors to (innocent) outside sources. Finally,
‘assuming the worst’ is the attribution of hostile intentions
to others and the expectation of worst-case scenarios
(Barriga and Gibbs 1996).
Although this four-category typology describes the four
cognitive distortions as interrelated constructs, it could be
expected that some distortions are more important in pro-
active aggression, whereas others are more important in
reactive aggression. Since proactive aggression is related to
problems with clarification of goals and the construction
and selection of a response (Crick and Dodge 1996), it
could be assumed that these processing steps are based on
self-serving beliefs that one’s own interests are more
important than those of others (self-centeredness) and that
aggressive behavior causes no real harm or is even admi-
rable (minimizing/mislabeling). Past research seems to
support this last expectation; children engaging in proac-
tive aggression have been found to value aggressive acts as
more positive than children not engaging in proactive
aggression (Crick and Dodge 1996).
In contrast, since reactive aggression is related to diffi-
culties with the encoding and interpretation of social cues
(Crick and Dodge 1996), it might be assumed that these
difficulties in processing steps derive from the distorted
assumptions that others have hostile intentions and that bad
things will happen (assuming the worst). The first has been
suggested by past research, showing that children engaging
in reactive aggression tend to perceive hostility from oth-
ers, even when no hostility was intended (Crick and Dodge
1996). This hostile attribution bias can be viewed as a
component of the cognitive distortion assuming the worst.
Furthermore, since reactive aggression results from a per-
ceived or real threat or provocation, it could be expected
that children engaging in reactive aggression justify their
behavior by stating that others are to blame for it, even if
these others actually are innocent (blaming others).
It has long been known that there is a bipolar dimension
of overt–covert antisocial behavior, with overt behaviors
consisting of confrontational acts and covert behaviors
consisting of more concealed acts (Loeber and Schmaling
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1985). More recent research has shown that there is a high
degree of behavior-specificity of cognitive distortions with
respect to these overt and covert behavioral referents (Liau
et al. 1998; Barriga et al. 2008). Overt-referential distortion
relates to actual overt behavior but not to covert behavior,
whereas covert-referential distortion relates to actual covert
behavior but not to overt behavior. This distinction
between cognitions about overt and covert antisocial
behaviors seems particularly valuable when studying dif-
ferent distorted beliefs in proactive and reactive aggression.
That is, given that reactive aggression and proactive
aggression represent different aggressive functions (reac-
tive, overt outbursts vs. deliberate and planned behavior),
these aggressive behaviors might be associated with dif-
ferent underlying beliefs about overt versus covert antiso-
cial behavior. Because proactive aggression is planned and
unprovoked, these distorted thoughts probably concern
both direct, confrontational behaviors, and calculated,
nonconfrontational behaviors. Hence, proactive aggression
was expected to be associated to ‘self-centeredness’ and
‘minimizing/mislabeling’ with respect to both overt and
covert antisocial behaviors. In contrast, because reactive
aggression is characterized by affective outbursts, it prob-
ably is associated with thoughts about direct, confronta-
tional behaviors, but not with thoughts about indirect, more
planned behaviors. Therefore, reactive aggression was
proposed to be related to the cognitive distortions
‘assuming the worst’ and ‘blaming others’ with respect to
overt, but not covert, antisocial behaviors.
Personality Traits Associated with Proactive
and Reactive Aggression
When studying the relationship between cognitive distor-
tions and proactive and reactive aggression, it is important
to acknowledge that differences in social-cognitive func-
tioning cannot fully account for different behavioral
responses. Research has already shown that the relationship
between cognitive functioning and general aggression or
antisocial behavior is not similar for every individual, but
rather depends on characteristics of the child. A common
feature of these studies is their focus on person character-
istics related to self-regulation (e.g., Fite et al. 2008; Meier
and Robinson 2004). Therefore, the current study did not
only focus on cognitive distortions, but also took into
account such self-regulatory personality traits. Focus was
on the personality traits agreeableness and conscientious-
ness, which have shown to both be core personality traits
underlying self-regulation (Jensen-Campbell et al. 2002). It
was chosen to focus on core, rather than surface, person
characteristics (cf. Asendorpf and van Aken 2003), to
clearly distinguish fundamental behavioral tendencies
from cognitions and attributions. This enabled a clear
investigation of the distinct roles of personality and cog-
nitions in aggression.
Agreeableness is associated with inhibitory processes
needed to control selfish, disagreeable tendencies (Ahadi
and Rothbart 1994). When a child experiences tension
between individual and social interests, agreeableness will
lead to inhibition of selfish tendencies in favour of social
concerns, because of the motivation to maintain positive
relations with others (Graziano et al. 1996). This is sup-
ported by the finding that, although agreeable individuals
do experience anger when confronted with a negative sit-
uation, this does not lead to aggressive behavioral
responses (Jensen-Campbell et al. 2007). Proactive-
aggressive tendencies to view aggression as an effective
means to reach goals (Crick and Dodge 1996) seem to be in
line with the selfish and hostile tendencies in disagreeable
children (Graziano et al. 1996). Moreover, the finding that
agreeableness affects the expression of experienced anger
(Jensen-Campbell et al. 2007), suggests that low levels of
agreeableness are related to aspects of reactive aggression,
such as disinhibition of disagreeable responses when con-
fronted with a provocation. Hence, both proactive and
reactive aggression were expected to be related to
agreeableness.
Conscientiousness also is related to several aspects of
self-regulation, such as the ability to inhibit behaviors
and the ability to persist in tasks. It has already been
shown that anger is only related to aggression in indi-
viduals low on conscientiousness, suggesting that indi-
viduals with higher levels of conscientiousness are better
able to regulate their behavior when they experience
anger (Jensen-Campbell et al. 2007). Together, agree-
ableness and conscientiousness are personality traits that
result from the temperamental precursor Effortful Con-
trol (EC), which describes children’s capacities to plan
behavior, focus and shift attention and suppress a dom-
inant behavior to perform a subdominant response (Ah-
adi and Rothbart 1994). Low levels of conscientiousness
might be related to characteristics of reactive aggression,
such as deficiencies in the regulation of behavioral
reactivity when confronted with a frustration. However,
since proactive aggression is deliberate rather than pro-
voked, it was assumed to be unrelated to behavioral
control-processes of conscientiousness.
Furthermore, it was expected that these personality traits
would affect the relationships between cognitive distor-
tions and proactive and reactive aggression. Children who
have higher levels of self-control may be less likely to
engage in aggressive behaviors, even if their social-cog-
nitions would ‘put them at risk’. That is, self-centeredness
and minimizing/mislabeling were expected to be related to
proactive aggression, but only in children low on agree-
ableness. Blaming others and assuming the worst were
778 Cogn Ther Res (2012) 36:776–787
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thought to be related to reactive aggression, but only
among children with low levels of agreeableness and
conscientiousness.
Summary of the Aims
In short, the aims of the present study were twofold. The
first research question focused on whether types of cogni-
tive distortions were differently related to proactive and
reactive aggression. The second research question exam-
ined whether agreeableness and conscientiousness were
differently related to proactive and reactive aggression
and whether the expected relationships between cogni-
tive distortions and proactive and reactive aggression
were dependent upon levels of conscientiousness and
agreeableness.
In order to answer these research questions, children
within the sixth grade of elementary school participated
in the study. This was considered the most ideal age
period for the measurements of the present study. The
children had to be able to reflect on their cognitions and
personality, and in addition peer pressure with respect to
antisocial behavior has shown to increase in adolescence
(e.g., Sim and Koh 2003). Data were collected cross-




The sample of this study consisted of 185 sixth grade
children from nine classes of five regular elementary
schools from the Netherlands. During data collection, 7
participants were absent. Of the remaining 178 children,
173 received parental consent (57.2% boys, 42.8% girls).
Compared to the children in the final sample, the children
who did not receive parental consent did not differ in their
amount of nominations for proactive aggression [t (176) =
.11, P = .91] and reactive aggression [t (176) = 1.16,
P = .25]. Similarly, absent children did not differ from
their peers in their amount of nominations for proactive
aggression [t (178) = 1.09, P = .28] and reactive aggres-
sion [t (178) = .41, P = .69].
Participants were 10–13 years old (M = 11.7, SD = .6).
Both schools from small villages and larger cities from
different regions of the Netherlands participated. The
sample contained 71.1% children with parents born in the
Netherlands, 6.9% children with parents born in Turkey/
Morocco, 9.2% children with parents born in Surinam/
the Antilles, and 12.7% children with parents born in
other countries, thereby being representative of the Dutch




In order to measure the four cognitive distortions, the How
I Think Questionnaire (HIT-Q), Dutch translation (Nas
et al. 2008), was administered to all children. Psychometric
properties of this questionnaire are satisfactory (Nas et al.
2008). Self-centeredness was measured with nine items,
such as ‘Getting what you need is the only important thing’
(Cronbach’s a = .74). Minimizing/mislabeling was repre-
sented by nine items, including ‘Only a coward would walk
away from a fight’ (Cronbach’s a = .74). Blaming others
was measured with ten items, for example ‘I lose my
temper because people try to make me mad’ (Cronbach’s
a = .72). Assuming the worst was represented by eleven
items, including ‘You can’t trust people because they will
always lie to you’ (Cronbach’s a = .75). Also, seven
positive filler items were included to camouflage the items
about cognitive distortions, such as ‘Friends should be
honest with each other’. The children rated all statements
on a 6-point Likert scale, ranging from totally disagree to
totally agree. Higher scores on the cognitive distortions
indicated higher levels of cognitive distortions.1
In addition, the abovementioned scales could be divided
into eight scales of the cognitive distortions in relation to
overt and covert antisocial behavior. This resulted in four
scales for overt behavior; self-centeredness-overt behavior
(five items, Cronbach’s a = .60), minimizing/mislabeling-
overt behavior (four items, Cronbach’s a = .55), assuming
the worst-overt behavior (six items, Cronbach’s a = .64),
blaming others-overt behavior (five items, Cronbach’s
a = .59), and four scales for covert behavior; self-cen-
teredness-covert behavior (four items, Cronbach’s a = .59),
minimizing/mislabeling-covert behavior (five items, Cron-
bach’s a = .65), assuming the worst-covert behavior (five
items, Cronbach’s a = .65), blaming others-covert behavior
(five items, Cronbach’s a = .64).
1 The questionnaire contained an additional scale to measure social
desirability. The scale consisted of seven items, for instance ‘I have
sometimes said something bad about a friend’ (Cronbach’s a = .75),
where higher scores indicated lower levels of social desirability. To
account for possible effects of social desirability on the results, two
data files were composed; one with all participants and one without
participants with a score on the anomalous response scale of the HIT-
Q below the cut-off value 2.75. All analyses were conducted with
both data files. Since no differences in results were found, it was
decided to use the complete data file, in order to obtain optimal
power.
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Agreeableness and Conscientiousness
Agreeableness and conscientiousness were measured with
the Big Five Inventory (BFI), Dutch translation (Denissen
et al. 2008), which has shown to be a psychometrically
valid questionnaire. Agreeableness was represented by nine
items, for instance ‘I see myself as someone who is con-
siderate and kind to almost everyone’ (Cronbach’s
a = .63). Conscientiousness was measured with nine
items, such as ‘I see myself as someone who makes plans
and follows through with them’ (Cronbach’s a = .72).
Children were asked to rate their agreement with the
statements on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from strongly
disagree to strongly agree. Items with a reversed score were
recoded, after which mean scores on the items of the two
scales were calculated. Higher scores indicated higher
levels of agreeableness and conscientiousness.
Proactive and Reactive Aggression
Nominations for Five Functions of Aggression The
dependent variables proactive and reactive aggression were
assessed through peer nominations, using the peer nomina-
tions version of the teacher-report Instrument for Reactive and
Proactive Aggression (IRPA; Polman et al. 2008). Peer
nominations have been shown to be a reliable measure for
aggressive behaviors (Dodge and Coie 1987). Four questions
were asked about four types of aggressive behavior, including
‘Which children kick, hit or push other children?’ (physical
aggression), ‘Which children call other children names?’
(verbal aggression), ‘Which children gossip or tell lies about
other children?’ (relational aggression), and ‘Which children
do sneaky things that are not allowed?’ (covert aggression).
For every question, the children could nominate up to five
classmates, although this was not obligatory. After having
nominated a classmate, the children had to choose the function
of the aggressive behavior from a list of five functions: e.g.,
‘If…calls someone names, why does he/she do that? Because
he/she (1) is angry, (2) is being bullied, (3) wants to be mean,
(4) wants to reach his/her goal, (5) wants to be the boss’.
Multiple functions could be chosen, meaning that a child
could be nominated for a reactive and a proactive function
simultaneously for the same aggressive behavior. For every
child, the received nominations were counted per function.
According to the IRPA, the reactive aggression scale consists
of functions one and two, whereas the proactive aggression
scale consists of functions three, four and five. However,
principal component analysis on the current data showed that,
within the present sample, this specific distinction was not
found. The rotated factor solution demonstrated the existence
of two factors (factors with Eigenvalues [1), together
accounting for 76.52% of the variability in the original five
variables. Within this two-factor solution, ‘bullied’ loaded
high on one factor, whereas ‘mean’, ‘goal’ and ‘boss’ loaded
high on the other factor. Yet, ‘angry’ loaded on both factors
(Table 1). Therefore, it was decided to exclude the ‘angry’
function from the analysis.
Nominations for Proactive and Reactive Aggression For
every child, the received nominations for reactive and pro-
active aggression were counted. This was done for all four
questions of aggression (physical, verbal, relational, covert
aggression) separately. For reactive aggression, a child
received a 1-score when being nominated by a classmate for
the reactive function (bullied). Similarly, for proactive
aggression, a child received a 1-score when being nominated
by a classmate for one or more of the proactive functions
(mean, goal, boss). The nominations the child received from
all classmates for proactive and reactive aggression were
summed across all four questions of aggression, resulting in
two scales of proactive and reactive aggression, with scores
possibly ranging from 0 to 4 times the size of the class.
Influence of class size was corrected for during the actual data
analysis. Children with higher scores on the variables proac-
tive and reactive aggression were nominated more often by
their classmates on these types of aggression, as compared to
children with lower scores on these variables.
Procedure
The questionnaires were administered in the classroom to all
children simultaneously, during school hours. Instructions
were read out loud. It was explained that there were no right or
wrong answers and confidentiality was emphasized. The
children completed the BFI, HIT-Q and the peer nominations
consecutively. Duration of the procedure was 1 h on average.
Data Analysis
It was intended to conduct a multiple regression analysis,
for which model assumptions were checked, according to
the criteria derived from Tabachnick and Fidell (2007).
Table 1 Factor loadings of the five functions of aggression on the





Being angry .63 .41
Being bullied .04 .96
Wanting to be mean .88 .14
Wanting to reach a goal .88 .09
Wanting to be the boss .88 -.08
Received nominations of proactive and reactive aggression were
corrected for class size
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Yet, results showed that proactive and reactive aggression
were both severely positively skewed and could not be
transformed. Therefore, instead of being analyzed as nor-
mal continuous variables, they were interpreted as rate
data. Rate data represent a discrete probability distribution,
where the rate is a count of events occurring to a particular
participant, divided by some measure of that participant’s
exposure to the event (Agresti 2002). In the present study,
the rate was the number (count) of received nominations
for proactive or reactive aggression occurring to a partic-
ular child, divided by that child’s exposure to receiving
nominations, that is, the size of the class. In order to ana-
lyze these rate data, negative binomial regression analyses
were conducted (Agresti 2002).2 Results were expressed as
odds ratios. Scores on cognitive distortions and personality
traits were used to predict a child’s odds of receiving a
nomination for reactive or proactive aggression, when
taking into account the size of the class. An alpha level of
.05 was used for all statistical analyses.
Negative binomial regression analyses were performed
for the dependent variables proactive and reactive aggres-
sion and the independent variables (a) the four cognitive
distortions, (b) overt and covert subtypes of the cognitive
distortions, and (c) agreeableness and conscientiousness. In
addition, separate negative binomial regression analyses
were performed for possible interaction effects among
cognitive distortions and personality traits. Both the scores
on the cognitive distortions and the scores on the person-
ality traits were centered, to avoid multicollinearity prob-
lems (Tabachnick and Fidell 2007).
Results
Descriptive Analysis
Table 2 presents the scale means, standard deviations and
the range of the cognitive distortions and the personality
traits. Of the 173 children, 116 children were nominated for
proactive aggression once or more, whereby per question
the children were nominated by 0–75% of the classmates.
For reactive aggression, 49 children were nominated once
or more, whereby per question the children were nominated
by 0–18.18% of the classmates. Furthermore, correlational
analyses were conducted to examine overall patterns
among variables (Table 3). The cognitive distortions
appeared to be strongly, positively correlated, indicating
that higher scores on one cognitive distortion were related
to higher scores on another cognitive distortion. The per-
sonality traits agreeableness and conscientiousness were
moderately, positively correlated, indicating higher levels
of agreeableness to be related to higher levels of consci-
entiousness. Agreeableness correlated negatively with the
four cognitive distortions and proactive and reactive
aggression, whereas conscientiousness was mostly unre-
lated to these variables. Finally, there appeared to be a
weak, positive correlation between reactive and proactive
aggression; increased nominations on one type of aggres-
sion were associated with elevated nominations on the
other type of aggression. Yet, this correlation was much
weaker than was found in most previous studies on pro-
active and reactive aggression (Polman et al. 2007). In
order to control for this correlation, during all main anal-
yses proactive aggression was added to the baseline model
when predicting reactive aggression, and vice versa.
Next, it was examined whether demographic character-
istics were significant predictors of proactive and reactive
aggression. Gender appeared to be a significant predictor
both of proactive aggression (b = .63, P = .01), and of
reactive aggression (b = .50, P = .06). As compared to
Table 2 Descriptive statistics of study variables
M SD Range
Self-centeredness 2.36 .78 1.00–5.44
Overt 1.99 .77 1.00–5.00
Covert 2.81 1.03 1.00–5.00
Minimizing harm 2.24 .72 1.00–4.56
Overt 2.53 .89 1.00–5.50
Covert 2.02 .75 1.00–5.00
Blaming others 2.43 .75 1.00–5.10
Overt 2.50 .96 1.00–5.50
Covert 2.36 .82 1.00–5.40
Assuming the worst 2.19 .68 1.00–5.00
Overt 2.55 .83 1.00–5.33
Covert 1.77 .71 1.00–4.60
Conscientiousness 3.38 .66 1.22–4.78
Agreeableness 3.76 .56 1.89–4.78
The four scales of the cognitive distortions were divided into eight
subscales for the particular distortions in relation to overt and covert
antisocial behavior
2 Although a Poisson regression is the standard method to model rate
data, the present data showed overdispersion, indicating that the
observed variances were larger than the means (M = 5.08,
r2 = 72.88 for proactive aggression and M = .50, r2 = 1.03 for
reactive aggression). Because Poisson’s assumption of equidispersion
(the variance being equal to its mean) was violated, a negative
binomial model was chosen, which models overdispersed Poisson
data. Since the possibility of being nominated depended upon of
number of children in the class, the differences in class size
(differences in the exposure to the nominations) needed to be
controlled for. In negative binomial regression this is handled as an
offset (the natural logarithm of class size-1). The offset was included
as a predictor variable in the model, but was differentiated from other
variables by being analyzed as a constant (forced to have a coefficient
1) and therefore being independent of scores of other predictor
variables (Agresti 2002).
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girls, boys were 1.88 and 1.65 times as likely to become
nominated for proactive aggression and reactive aggres-
sion, respectively. Furthermore, although ethnicity did not
predict reactive aggression (b = .37, P = .16), ethnicity
appeared to be a significant predictor of proactive aggres-
sion (b = .96, P = .01), with children with parents not
born in the Netherlands being 2.61 times as likely to
become nominated for proactive aggression as compared to
children with parents born in the Netherlands. Based on
these results, it was decided to control for gender and
ethnicity during all main analyses.
Cognitive Distortions Associated with Proactive
and Reactive Aggression
Proactive Aggression
First, it was analyzed whether the four cognitive distortions
could predict proactive aggression (Model 1, Table 4). In
line with the hypothesis, self-centeredness was a positive
predictor of the probability of being nominated for proac-
tive aggression, when controlling for the other cognitive
distortions. For an increase of one point on the scores of
self-centeredness, the odds of becoming nominated for
proactive aggression increased with 62%. Although
hypothesized, minimizing/mislabeling did not predict pro-
active aggression. As was expected, blaming others and
assuming the worst did not predict proactive aggression.
Next, a distinction was made between cognitive distor-
tions about overt antisocial behavior and covert antisocial
behavior (Model 2, Table 4). Again, when controlling for
the others distortions, results demonstrated that self-cen-
tered cognitive distortions about overt antisocial behavior
were a significant positive predictor. For a one unit
increase in self-centeredness with respect to overt behavior,
the odds of becoming nominated for proactive aggression
increased with approximately 60%. Other types of distorted
thoughts about overt and covert antisocial behavior did not
predict the probability of being nominated for proactive
aggression.
In conclusion, although self-centeredness and minimiz-
ing/mislabeling with respect to overt and covert antisocial
behaviors were expected to predict proactive aggression,
only self-centeredness about overt (not covert) behaviors
appeared to be an important predictor. As expected,
blaming others and assuming the worst were unrelated to
nominations of proactive aggression.
Reactive Aggression
Second, it was analyzed whether the four cognitive dis-
tortions could predict the odds of being nominated for
reactive aggression (Model 1, Table 4). Although it was
expected that blaming others and assuming the worst
would be related to reactive aggression, none of the cog-
nitive distortions could predict reactive aggression when
controlling for the other distortions.
As for proactive aggression, additional analyses were
conducted with the cognitive distortions in reference to
overt versus covert antisocial behaviors (Model 2,
Table 4). Findings demonstrated that, although blaming
others in general was unpredictive of reactive aggression,
blaming others for overt antisocial behavior was a positive
predictor of reactive aggression, when controlling for the
other cognitive distortions. For one point increase in
blaming others for overt antisocial behavior, the odds of
being nominated for reactive aggression increased with
46%. Other distorted thoughts about overt and covert
antisocial behavior were unrelated to reactive aggression.
These findings partly confirmed the expectations.
Although, both blaming others and assuming the worst
were hypothesized to predict reactive aggression, only
blaming others with respect to overt antisocial behavior
appeared to be a significant predictor. As expected, reactive
Table 3 Intercorrelations among study variables
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. Self-centeredness 1.00
2. Minimizing .72*** 1.00
3. Blaming others .67*** .71*** 1.00
4. Assuming the worst .69*** .74*** .74*** 1.00
5. Conscientiousness -.19* -.15 -.13 -.19* 1.00
6. Agreeableness -.38*** -.38*** -.46*** -.45*** .36*** 1.00
7. Proactive aggression .23** .17* .20** .17* -.05 -.31** 1.00
8. Reactive aggression .23** .23** .27*** .25*** -.10 -.17* .17* 1.00
Received nominations of proactive and reactive aggression were corrected for class size
* P \ .05
** P \ .01
*** P \ .001
782 Cogn Ther Res (2012) 36:776–787
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aggression was not predicted by self-centeredness and
minimizing/mislabeling.
Personality Traits Associated with Proactive
and Reactive Aggression
Although being separate constructs, agreeableness and
conscientiousness together serve a self-regulatory function
(Jensen-Campbell et al. 2007). Therefore, they were
examined with and without taking into account their shared
variances. Both models showed that agreeableness was a
significant negative predictor of the probability of being
nominated for proactive aggression, whereas conscien-
tiousness was unrelated to proactive aggression (Table 4).
If a child’s score on agreeableness increased with one
point, the odds of being nominated for proactive aggression
decreased with approximately 55% for a one unit increase
in agreeableness. These findings confirmed the expecta-
tions; agreeableness, but not conscientiousness, was nega-
tively related to proactive aggression.
For reactive aggression, both agreeableness and
conscientiousness were (marginally) significant negative
predictors when not taking into account the overlap among
both personality traits (Models 3 and 4, Table 4). Children
with higher levels of agreeableness and conscientiousness
were less likely to become nominated for reactive aggres-
sion, as compared to children with lower levels of these
personality traits. Yet, when controlling for the shared
variances, neither agreeableness nor conscientiousness
were significant predictors (Model 5, Table 4). Although it
was hypothesized that both traits would predict reactive
aggression, this was only found when shared variances
were part of the prediction.
Besides these main effects, interactions among the
cognitive distortions and agreeableness and conscien-
tiousness were expected. However, no significant interac-
tion effects were found.
Discussion
This study aimed to further explore the mechanisms behind
proactive and reactive aggression. First, it was examined
whether proactive and reactive aggression were differently
Table 4 Estimates resulting from the prediction of proactive aggression and reactive aggression by cognitive distortions and personality traits
Proactive aggression Reactive aggression
b SE Exp(b) P value b SE Exp(b) P value
Model 1
Self-centeredness .48 .23 1.62 .03 .11 .26 1.12 .68
Minimizing .10 .26 1.11 .71 .02 .29 1.02 .95
Blaming others -.10 .26 .90 .70 .29 .27 1.34 .28
Assuming the worst -.19 .29 .83 .51 .24 .28 1.27 .39
Model 2
Overt–self-centeredness .47 .23 1.60 .04 -.15 .26 .86 .58
Overt–minimizing .03 .19 1.03 .88 .15 .20 1.16 .44
Overt–blaming others .05 .16 1.05 .75 .38 .19 1.46 .04
Overt–assuming the worst -.02 .22 .98 .92 -.08 .21 .92 .69
Covert–self-centeredness .08 .15 1.08 .56 .16 .18 1.17 .35
Covert–minimizing .12 .24 1.13 .63 -.05 .24 .95 .82
Covert–blaming others -.17 .20 .84 .40 -.13 .21 .88 .52
Covert–assuming the worst -.28 .26 .76 .29 .36 .25 1.43 .15
Model 3
Agreeableness (shared ? unique) -.73 .22 .48 .00 -.42 .23 .66 .05
Model 4
Conscientiousness (shared ? unique) -.15 .17 .86 .39 -.36 .19 .70 .06
Model 5
Agreeableness (unique) -.80 .24 .45 .00 -.28 .26 .76 .28
Conscientiousness (unique) .13 .19 1.14 .49 -.26 .21 .77 .23
Reactive aggression was added to the model when predicting proactive aggression. Proactive aggression was added to the model when predicting
reactive aggression. Results from the negative binomial regression analyses were expressed as coefficient b. Exp(b) was interpreted in terms of
odds ratios. The formula 100[Exp(b) – 1] provided the percentage change in number of peer nominations for each unit increase in the predictor
variable (Agresti 2002)
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predicted by cognitive distortions. As was expected, pro-
active aggression was predicted by self-centeredness about
overt behaviors, but not by blaming others and assuming
the worst. In contrast to the hypothesis, minimizing/mis-
labeling was unrelated to proactive aggression. Reactive
aggression was predicted by blaming others about overt
behaviors, but not by self-centeredness and minimizing/
mislabeling, which confirmed the hypothesis. However,
assuming the worst was not associated with reactive
aggression. Second, it was explored whether proactive and
reactive aggression were differently predicted by the per-
sonality traits agreeableness and conscientiousness and
whether these traits moderated the relationships between
the cognitive distortions and proactive and reactive
aggression. As was hypothesized, proactive aggression was
predicted by agreeableness, but not by conscientiousness.
Although, reactive aggression was expected to be associ-
ated with both personality traits, agreeableness and con-
scientiousness only were significant predictors when not
controlling for the overlap among both traits. In contrast to
the expectations, agreeableness and conscientiousness did
not moderate the associations between the distortions and
proactive and reactive aggression. Taken this together,
present results were in line with previous findings that
proactive aggression and reactive aggression are two dis-
tinct types of aggression with different underlying markers
(e.g., Polman et al. 2007). Although, the behavioral
expressions are similar, they serve different functions and
are driven by different social-cognitive processes and
personality traits.
It was found that proactive aggression is predicted by
the self-centered belief that one’s own interests and needs
are more important than those of others. Possibly, when
encountering a social situation, this egocentric bias pro-
motes selection of selfish goals and subsequent aggressive
responses to reach these goals. Because aggression is likely
to lead to the desired outcome, the positive view of
aggression as a means to fulfil egocentric goals may
become reinforced and therefore strengthen over time. This
is in line with social learning principles associated with
proactive aggression, which state that proactive aggression
is driven by positive outcome expectancies and is con-
trolled by its reinforcements (Dodge and Coie 1987). It
should be noted however, that the prediction of proactive
aggression by self-centeredness only holds when the ego-
centric beliefs refer to overt antisocial behaviors (e.g., ‘You
should get what you need, even if it means someone has to
get hurt’), not covert behaviors (e.g., ‘If I see something I
like, I take it’). Since proactive aggression is planned and
unprovoked, it was expected that children engaging in
proactive aggression would apply their egocentric bias to
thoughts about overt, confrontational as well as covert,
more calculated behaviors. As research has already shown
a high degree of cognition-behavior specificity (Barriga
et al. 2008), the fact that no cognitive distortions about this
type of behaviors were found might be explained by the
fact that overt behaviors such as physical aggression are
relatively common, whereas covert behaviors such as
stealing might be rare within this nonclinical sample.
Besides this role of self-centeredness, it was expected
that the belief that antisocial behavior causes no real harm
and is acceptable (minimizing/mislabeling) would con-
tribute to proactive aggressive behaviors as well. However,
this was not supported by the present results. Perhaps these
‘typical’ children know that aggressive behavior generally
is not acceptable (low score on minimizing/mislabeling).
Yet, only when it serves their own needs, they think it is
justified (high score on self-centeredness).
Based on previous studies that have found moderating
effects of characteristics of self-control on the relation
between social-cognitive processes and aggression, it was
expected that the association between self-centeredness
and proactive aggression would be dependent upon a
child’s level of agreeableness. However, this was not
supported by the current findings. Both children who are
more disagreeable and children who are more self-centered
engage in proactive aggression more often as compared to
less disagreeable and less self-centered children. Also,
children who are more disagreeable tend to have more self-
centered thoughts. However, proactive aggression is pre-
dicted by self-centeredness regardless of a child’s level of
agreeableness, and vice versa.
In contrast to proactive aggression, reactive aggression
has previously been associated with problems with the
encoding and the interpretation of social cues (Crick and
Dodge 1996). Surprisingly, the expectation that assuming
worst case scenarios and hostile intentions from others
would predict reactive aggression was not confirmed by the
present study. This might be explained by the present
measurement of reactive aggression. Due to validity
problems with one of the items for reactive aggression, the
definition of reactive aggression was restricted to ‘aggres-
sion in reaction to being bullied’. This implies that the
behavior is a result of a child’s actual victimization, not
just a child’s expectation or perception of threat. The child
could not misinterpret the situation as threatening, because
he or she was truly victimized, as was observed by peers.
Yet, assuming the worst might be involved in reactive
aggression based on perceived rather than actual threat,
because biased assumptions probably only affect interpre-
tations and subsequent behavior in ambiguous or neutral
situations, but not in situations where one is clearly being
bullied.
As was expected, reactive aggression was predicted by
thoughts of blaming others in reference to overt (e.g., ‘I
lose my temper because people try to make me mad’), not
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covert (e.g., ‘People force me to lie when they ask me too
many questions’), antisocial behaviors. The reactive-
aggressive anger probably is expressed through overt,
primitive behaviors such as physical aggression, rather than
through covert, nonconfrontational behaviors such as lying
or stealing. Since distortions are behavior-specific (Barriga
et al. 2008), it seems not surprising that they only refer to
overt antisocial behaviors. Yet, these findings have to be
replicated in clinical samples, because the null-finding of
distortions related to covert antisocial behaviors could also
reflect the absence of such indirect conduct-disordered type
of behaviors within the present sample.
Besides this cognitive distortion, agreeableness and
conscientiousness were also expected to play a role in
reactive aggression. Interestingly, findings showed that
only the combined effect of conscientiousness and agree-
ableness was important for reactive aggression. As
described earlier, agreeableness and conscientiousness are
considered to result from the temperamental precursor EC,
which fulfils a self-regulatory function (Ahadi and Rothbart
1994). Agreeableness is important in the regulation of
frustration coming from others (e.g., inhibition of dis-
agreeable tendencies), whereas conscientiousness is
important in the regulation of frustration coming from tasks
(e.g., inhibition of certain behaviors in favour of others)
(Caspi and Shiner 2006). It seems this self-regulatory
aspect that determines whether a reactive-aggressive
reaction can be suppressed to perform a more appropriate
response, rather than the unique characteristics of both
traits. Since agreeableness and conscientiousness were no
unique predictors of reactive aggression, there were no
moderating functions of self-regulatory person character-
istics on the association between social-cognitions and
aggression.
This study has some important theoretical and practical
implications. The identification of distinctive cognitive
distortions underlying both types of aggression not only
supports previous findings that social information is pro-
cessed differently, but extends this literature by revealing
why the information is processed differently, thereby con-
tributing to what is referred to by social information pro-
cessing theorists as the identification of ‘latent knowledge
constructs’ (Dodge and Rabiner 2004) underlying both
types of aggression. Moreover, associated self-regulatory
personality traits have been found to differ as well. These
findings reaffirm the need to differentiate aggressive
behaviors based on their functions. Instead of there being
one general mindset related to aggression, different cog-
nitive distortions and self-regulatory traits predict different
types of aggression. This detailed information should help
improve the formulation of different goals and guidelines
for educational programs and cognitive therapy for proac-
tive and reactive aggression.
An important additional implication for research spe-
cifically on self-serving cognitive distortions is the finding
that different distortions differently relate to types of
problem behavior. Until now, the four distortions are
examined as interrelated constructs. Yet, the present study
showed that they can occur in one person independently
from each other. This should be acknowledged when
studying self-serving cognitive distortions.
One limitation of this study is the fact that the design
does not allow to infer causation. Although, cognitions and
personality in general are said to drive behavior, previous
experiences and behaviors can also affect cognitions. This
however, can not be concluded from the current findings
and should be studied by future research. Furthermore, the
results only apply to aggression in a nonclinical sample.
Nonetheless, since even within a nonclinical sample dis-
tinctive patterns among proactive and reactive aggression
have been found, it could be suggested that these differ-
ences will even be more pronounced within a clinical
sample. However, it does seem worthwhile to actually
study associations between distortions with respect to
covert antisocial behaviors and proactive and reactive
aggression within a clinical sample. Another limitation
regards the low reliabilities of the eight subscales mea-
suring the overt and covert cognitive distortions, which was
probably due to the limited amount of items covering each
subscale. Yet, despite this, it was chosen to use the sub-
scales, in order to further discern the different types of
cognitive distortions, providing a more nuanced view of the
relationship between cognitions and proactive and reactive
aggression. Finally, the measurement of reactive aggres-
sion was restricted. Although, an existing questionnaire
was used, one item for reactive aggression had to be
removed from the analyses, which resulted in a restricted
definition of reactive aggression (‘a reaction to being bul-
lied’). Interestingly however, the degree of association
among both types of aggression was much weaker than in
previous studies (Polman et al. 2007), indicating that pro-
active and reactive aggression were now distinguished
more effectively. Possibly, reactive aggression is differ-
entiated better from proactive aggression when the defini-
tion includes aggression only as a result of a true
provocation, as compared with broader definitions that also
include for example aggression in anticipation to a per-
ceived threat. Future research should further explore this
possibility.
Strength of the present study is the fact that the sample
consisted of children from different areas and schools
within the Netherlands. Demographic statistics such as
ethnicity showed that the sample was highly representative
of children within the Dutch population. Another strength
is the use of different reporters for different measures.
Especially for sensitive topics such as aggression and
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cognitive distortions, the use of same reporters for all
measures can lead to artificial associations, due to shared
method variance. This risk of confounded reports has been
minimized, by using self-reports for cognitive and per-
sonality measures, but peer nominations for the behavioral
aggression measures. Peer nominations have been shown to
be an appropriate method for measuring aggressive
behaviors, since observations of the same behavior are
provided by many different informants. No single infor-
mant can extremely affect a child’s final score (Huesmann
et al. 1994).
In conclusion, the current study differentiated proactive
and reactive aggression based on cognitive distortions and
self-regulatory personality traits. Overall, the findings
suggest that proactive aggression is predicted by egocentric
and disagreeable tendencies, whereas reactive aggression is
predicted by poor self-regulation and the misattribution of
blame to others. This emphasizes the need to differentiate
aggression on basis of its function. Specification of dif-
ferent programs and interventions based on these differ-
ences is important.
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